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Professor Gray's characterization of title VII case law involving uni-
versities is generally correct: colleges and universities have been the big
winners; individual challengers to hiring, promotion, and tenure deci-
sions have been the big losers.' However, this pattern is not very differ-
ent from the outcomes of individual treatment cases generally, and
specifically of cases involving so-called "higher level" jobs: plaintiffs win
very few.
2
The reasons for this pattern are not hard to find. Current title VII
law allocates the burdens of proof in individual disparate treatment, Mc-
Donnell Douglas3-type cases in ways that give the defendant the upper
hand. The plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving discriminatory
intent, and, according to the Supreme Court's Burdine decision,4 a court
must evaluate a defendant's response against a backdrop of broad em-
ployer discretion.5 Employers can set job qualifications as hiih as they
wish, as long as the criteria are applied evenhandedly. They are free to
select from among equally qualified candidates, as long as their decisions
are based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds. The decisions may
even be based on largely subjective considerations, such as the ability of a
preferred candidate to "get along" better in the job setting. 6
Professor Gray's observation that disparate impact, Griggs7 -type
* Professor of Law, Yale University. LL.B. 1966, Yale University.
1. See Gray, Academic Freedom and Nondiscrimination: Enemies or Allies?, 66 TEXAS L.
REv. 1591, 1596 (1988).
2. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REv. 945, 959
(1982) (noting "that the courts have generally granted upper level employers significant immunity
from title VII scrutiny").
3. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas Court
held that a title VII complainant must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
4. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
5. Id. at 256-57.
6. See id. at 251 (containing supervisor's testimony that employees were dismissed because
they did not work well with other employees).
7. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs Court held that an employer's
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cases against universities have not fared well" also applies readily to other
situations involving jobs that require a high degree of skill and discretion.
A much-cited Ninth Circuit decision in a national origin discrimination
case involving accountants and auditors adopted an exceedingly liberal
reading of Supreme Court precedent on the nature of the employer's bur-
den in ruling against a group of Mexican-American plaintiffs.9 Never-
theless, because disparate impact cases place a heavier burden of
justification upon employers than disparate treatment cases, disparate
impact cases still represent the most effective challenges to employment
discrimination in nonacademic settings.
Any change in the law will most likely come from the Supreme
Court in a case involving a bank's promotion practices.10 The case
presents the question of whether disparate impact analysis can be used to
challenge subjective employment practices. Most federal courts have al-
lowed Griggs-type challenges only when discrimination is claimed to be
the result of neutral, objective employment practices.II The Court should
allow plaintiffs to challenge subjective employment practices in order to
prevent employers from shielding their personnel practices from effective
judicial scrutiny even when such practices discriminate significantly.
This can be done without leaving employers bereft of a defense to such
claims, despite protests to the contrary.1 2 Employers need not be re-
requirement of a diploma or satisfactory intelligence test results was discriminatory. Id. at 431-32,
436.
8. Gray, supra note 1, at 1600.02.
9. See Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-80 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1021 (1982). The Supreme Court's opinion in Griggs characterized the employer's burden
as one of proving that the employment screening device was required by "business necessity" or
shown to be "job-related." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. The Court defined the burden as "showing that
any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id. at 432.
Dothard v. Rawlinson also suggested another test: that the challenged practice "be shown to be
necessary to safe and efficient job performance." 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977). The Contreras
court, however, stated that the foregoing formulations reflected implicit Supreme Court approval of
an employer's burden requiring a showing only that the challenged practices "significantly serve, but
are neither required by nor necessary to, the employer's legitimate business interests." Contreras,
656 F.2d at 1280.
10. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
3227 (1987).
11. See, e.g., Talley v. United Stites Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that
a subjective decision-making process cannot by itself form the foundation for a discriminatory im-
pact claim); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
disparate impact claim requires a sh.wing of an automatically applied objective standard, such as a
height or diploma requirement). But see Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1523 (11 th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the subjective elements of a selection process can be challenged).
12. See, eg., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1485 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The
defendants argue that the burden placed on an employer in an impact case is somehow made unduly
onerous when the practices identified as having a disparate impact are subjective in nature."). But
see Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Identification by the ag-
grieved party of the specific employment practice responsible for the disparate impact is necessary so
that the employer can respond by offering proof of its legitimacy."); Hunt & Pazuniak, Special
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quired to establish by way of formal validation that their subjective prac-
tices are "job-related" or required by "business necessity. 1' 3 Moreover,
some subjective criteria can be formally validated.
1 4
Such a ruling might require colleges and universities whose selec-
tion, promotion, or tenure processes have had a disproportionately nega-
tive impact upon women and minorities to develop probative
justifications for employment decisions for the first time in title VII
cases. This process might be difficult, but it will ultimately contribute to
the general improvement of university personnel policies and to the goal
of nondiscrimination in academic appointments.
Professor Gray focuses upon courts' resistance to claims of sex dis-
crimination in academic personnel matters.15 However, that pattern is
not unique to cases involving college and university selection, promotion,
and tenure. It is consistent with courts' historic treatment of sex discrim-
ination cases as being less serious than, say, race discrimination cases.
Early procedural rulings on "bona fide occupational qualifications,"
1 6
pregnancy discrimination,1 7 and sexual harassment18 evidenced this judi-
cial distinction between sex discrimination and other forms of discrimi-
nation. In fairness to the courts, the lack of any meaningful legislative
history in the 1964 Civil Rights Act on sex discrimination hindered ap-
plication of title VII to sex discrimination claims.19 Some contend that
Problems in Litigating Upper Level Employment Discrimination Cases, 4 DEL J. CORP. L. 114, 123-
34 (1978) (arguing that employers cannot defend subjective selection procedures when validation,
showing job relatedness, is not technically feasible); Note, Evaluation of Subjective Selection Systems
in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases: A Misuse of Disparate Impact Analysis, 7 CARDOZO
L. REV. 549, 577-82 (1986) (arguing that use of disparate impact analysis to challenge subjective
selection systems is "unfairly fatal" to employers because justifying subjective criteria is impossible).
13. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 191-205
(1983) (describing ways in which subjective practices can be successfully defended).
14. See Bartholet, supra note 2, at 987-88.
15. See Gray, supra note 1, at 1596-97.
16. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-37 (1977) (suggesting that being male is a
bona fide occupational qualification for prison guards in Alabama's violent, disorganized maximum
security prisons); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam) (sug-
gesting that lack of conflicting family obligations may be a bona fide occupational qualification
justifying differential treatment of male and female applicants).
17. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977) (holding that exclusion of preg-
nancy from sick-leave compensation plan does not constitute discrimination against women); Gen-
eral Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) ("lAin exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-
benefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all."). In 1978
Congress amended title VII to reverse the Gilbert and Satty rulings. See Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)); H.R. REP. No.
948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4749.
18. See, e.g., Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974) (holding
that sexual harassment is not sex discrimination), rev'd sub. nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 57-
99 (1979) (discussing the incoherence of opinions about whether sexual harassment is sex
discrimination).
19. Writing for the Court in Gilbert, Justice Rehnquist argued that "[w]hen Congress makes it
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this vacuum exists because some members of Congress added "sex" to
title VII in an ill-fated, last-ditch effort to torpedo the entire provision.20
These legislators incorrectly thought in 1963 that banning sex discrimi-
nation in employment wa. such an outrageous proposition that signifi-
cant numbers of their colleagues would rise up in opposition to title VII.
Assuming that they still hold antediluvian views, these members of Con-
gress might gain some satisfaction today from the strange, grudging way
in which women's rights have developed, thanks in part to their eleventh-
hour tactics.
Courts did not seem to treat sex discrimination claims with the seri-
ousness they deserve, even after 1972, when Congress amended title VII,
and even after 1978, when it added the Pregnancy Discrimination Act2'
to title VII. One would have thought that congressional concern about
limited opportunities for women in academe, as expressed in the 1972
amendments to title VII that extended its provisions to colleges and uni-
versities22 and in the 1972 Education Amendments to title IX that pro-
hibited sex discrimination by federally funded institutions,23 would have
suggested to judges the need to be especially sensitive to claims of em-
ployment discrimination based upon sex.
One area that Professor Gray discusses does appear to be unique to
employment discriminatiin suits against colleges and universities:
whether any privilege should attach to deliberations resulting in an ad-
verse decision in selection, promotion, or tenure. No other group of em-
ployers has been successful in getting courts to recognize such a
unlawful for an employer to 'discriminate... because of... sex .. .,' without further explanation of
its meaning, we should not readily infer that it meant something different from what the concept of
discrimination has traditionally meant." Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145. More recently, in Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the Court, observed that as
the amendment making sex discrimination illegal "was added to Title VII at the last minute on the
floor of the House of Representativ... we are left with little legislative history to guide us in
interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.'" Id. at 63-64.
20. See Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 310-12 (1968) (noting that sex
discrimination was added to title VII to block passage of the entire act and not to protect the em-
ployment rights of women).
21. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stal. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
22. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982)). The Senate Report on the bill specifically mentioned the situa-
tion of women in educational institutions: "Women are similarly subject to discriminatory patterns.
Not only are they generally underrep resented in institutions of higher learning, but those few that do
obtain positions are generally paid lem and advanced more slowly than their male counterparts." S.
REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971). In House debate on the bill, Representative Abzug
stated that the bill "would also extend coverage to teachers by eliminating the 'educational institu-
tion' exemption under title VII. This may well be the most important provision in terms of its effect
on women." 117 CONG. REC. 32097 (1971) (statement of Rep. Abzug).
23. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1982)).
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privilege. Courts have not allowed even religious institutions, which title
VII specifically exempts from liability for making personnel decisions on
a religious basis, to shield their practices from agency investigations seek-
ing to determine if an employer made a challenged decision on a prohib-
ited basis such as sex.24 This approach has been adopted even though
scrutiny of a religious institution's personnel decisions presents far
clearer constitutional problems, under the free exercise clause of the first
amendment, than an examination giving rise to claims of academic free-
dom. Law firms have fared no better. In a suit by a female associate
claiming that her denial of partnership was the result of sex discrimina-
tion, the Court held that a law firm's partnership selection process was
covered by title VII.25 The Court rejected the firm's claim that the prin-
ciple of associational freedom and the unique role of law firms in our
system of self-government entitled it to special consideration under title
VII.2 6
I agree with Professor Gray's position that courts should not give
colleges and universities special treatment in this respect.27 In particular
cases, academic employers should be able to show that protective orders
are warranted. But a blanket, generalized privilege is not necessary or
appropriate in title VII cases, given the public policy concerns underlying
that legislation.
I realize that the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) has suggested a compromise position on confidentiality to the
courts; the proposal has produced some positive response.28 Although I
appreciate the goals of the AAUP's proposal, the recommendation un-
fairly restricts plaintiffs' ability to conduct lawsuits as they see fit, abridg-
ing a privilege afforded to all other title VII plaintiffs. The proposal is
also premised on an unrealistic conception of how disparate treatment
cases are actually prosecuted. The three-stage McDonnell Douglas order
of proof is, by the Supreme Court's own standards, more an analytical
construct for evaluating evidence in discrimination cases than a formula
for determining how the trial should proceed.29 Plaintiffs need to know
24. See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming verdict in
favor of white female's suit to uphold the EEOC's right to investigate the faculty hiring practices of a
religious college accused of discrimination against blacks and women), cert denied, 453 U.S. 912
(1981).
25. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 77 (1984).
26. Id. at 77-78.
27. Gray, supra note 1, at 1600, 1615.
28. See American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure, A
Preliminary Statement on Judicially Compelled Disclosure in the Nonrenewal of Faculty Appoint-
ments, 67 ACADEME 27, 27-28 (1981). The Second Circuit adopted the AAUP approach in Gray v.
Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir. 1982).
29. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (stating
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all they can before putting on their case and should not have to await the
employer's claim of legitimate nondiscriminatory justifications before
seeking additional disclosure through discovery.
30
Finally, I want to address "hostile environments" in the academic
setting, an issue Professor Gray raises at the end of her essay. 31 Title VII
plaintiffs in academic cases should be able to claim that they are effec-
tively denied equal employment opportunity because the work environ-
ment presents hostility to them directly or to people of similar sex, race,
national origin, or other protected classes. Such hostility has an indirect
but significant impact upon the plaintiff's ability to function. The ques-
tion is whether the "robust" character of academic discourse-provoca-
tive, iconoclastic, and irreverent--can ever be "Exhibit A" in a case
involving hostile environment employment discrimination.
Hostile environment claims might well arise in academic settings.
Such actions might be aided by the current trend of courts to treat hostile
environment allegations in nonacademic contexts in the same way they
treat "fighting words" cases:32 a plaintiff must show that the insulting
language or activity was sufficiently particularized and personalized to
give her a reasonable basis for viewing it as an interference with job per-
formance and a denial of equal opportunity.3 3 This is not to say that
courts have come out right on the merits in all hostile environment cases;
I am only suggesting that the courts' analysis seems sensible. Conse-
quently, I am less concerned than Professor Gray that the theoretical
conflict she outlines between the robust nature of academic discourse and
hostile environment discrimination suits will have much practical
significance.
I have argued that the bleak picture for plaintiffs in title VII cases
that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case method requires the defendant to offer evidence of the
reason for the plaintiff's rejection and thereby allow the court to proceed to the factual inquiry of
whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff); Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (nating that the McDonnell Douglas test "was never intended to be
rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence
in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.").
30. For a more elaborate version of this argument, with examples, see DeLano, Discovery in
University Employment Discrimination Suit" Should Peer Review Materials be Privileged?, 14 J.C. &
U.L. 121, 138-42 (1987).
31. See Gray, supra note 1, at 1612-15.
32. See, eg., Gooding v. Wilon, 405 U.S. 518, 522-24 (1972) (outlining "fighting words"
doctrine).
33. See, e-g., Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 292-94 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (considering male super-
visor's sexual remarks in context, and requiring plaintiff to demonstrate pattern of harassment di-
rected at female employees or a particular employee); cf Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp.
244, 269-70 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (holding that racial derision, to be actionable, must be pervasive and
demonstrate a concerted pattern of. harassment); Sand v. Johnson Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 716, 719-20 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that explicit sexual conduct in the workplace does
not violate title VII unless there is a nexus between the conduct and the employment situation).
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against colleges and universities is not much different from that for indi-
viduals suing other types of employers. Despite the similarity of out-
comes, however, the attitudes of judges differ markedly in cases involving
academic and nonacademic settings. In cases involving nonacademic set-
tings, courts have at least demonstrated some understanding of the
source and nature of employment discrimination, of the way institutions
work, of which criteria are relevant, and of what remedies are adequate
in a particular situation. Examples of some judicial sensitivity to dis-
crimination issues are numerous. Even though it articulated the dispa-
rate impact test, the Court decided Griggs34 against a backdrop of racial
discrimination in education and other programs for opportunity in North
Carolina. The McDonnell Douglas decision on individual disparate treat-
ment posited for purposes of title VII cases the existence of the rational
employer or "utility maximizer," as my colleagues at Yale would say,
who does not reject a qualified candidate unless discrimination is at
work.35 In the Teamsters36 case, which involved class-action disparate
treatment claims, the Court adopted a presumption that, all other things
being equal, the percentage of minorities and women in an employer's
work force should equal the percentage of eligible candidates from those
groups in the labor pool.37 Franks38 creates a presumption in favor of
"rightful place" or "make whole" remedies in the industrial context.
39
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has not addressed the merits
of employment discrimination claims in the academic setting.40 Conse-
quently, the Court has not provided us with paradigms or models of ap-
propriate employment practices for academic institutions. The Court
has very little experience with cases involving admission, hiring, and gov-
ernance in higher education. Bakke4t was the Court's fist decision to
address directly racial discrimination in higher education since Haw-
kins42 in 1956. Moreover, lower courts have brought to their considera-
tion of such claims very little sense of the history of exclusionary
34. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that "more often
than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially
in a business setting").
36. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
37. Id. at 340 n.20 ("Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity between the composition of a
work force and that of the general population thus may be significant even though § 7030) makes
clear that title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general population.").
38. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
39. Id. at 764-66.
40. See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (involving college professor's sex
discrimination claim and addressing only the question of the employer's burden in a disparate treat-
ment case once a prima facie showing of discrimination had been made).
41. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
42. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 413 (1956) (per curiam) (hold-
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practices against women and minorities in higher education's selection,
promotion, and tenure processes. Nor have they developed a great deal
of understanding of what comprises the pools of eligible candidates for
academic positions, of what procedures, standards, and criteria are gen-
erally utilized in making such decisions, and of which remedies would be
effective and appropriate when discrimination is uncovered.
Now is not the time or place for me to describe an appropriate para-
digm or world view with respect to academic employment, even if I
could. One can certainly recognize, however, that the reconciliation of
the tension between academic freedom and antidiscrimination norms will
come from more, not leis, judicial scrutiny of decisions regarding, to
quote Justice Frankfurter, "'who may teach.' "43
ing that blacks are entitled to admlssion to graduate professional schools under rules applicable to all
other candidates).
43. Sweezy v. New Hampshir, 354 U.S. 234,263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting
a conference of scholars on academaic freedom).
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